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The Meaning of “Direct” Effect on
Domestic Commerce Under the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
John J. Miles∗
Claire Leonard’s Note discusses a question that has received
relatively little attention in the case law or commentary involving
the ability of the Sherman Antitrust Act 1 to reach unlawful
conduct occurring in a foreign country but affecting commerce
and competition in the United States: What standard should
courts apply in determining whether that conduct has a “direct”
effect on U.S. commerce, and if the domestic effect is also
substantial and foreseeable, whether the conduct is subject to the
Sherman Act under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act (FTAIA) of 1982. 2 When, for example, is the effect of a
price-fixing conspiracy occurring abroad but affecting the price of
the product in the United States sufficiently direct and thus
potentially subject to the Sherman Act to permit recovery of
damages by American consumers? As Ms. Leonard’s Note and
this Comment explain, the circuits are split on this question, and,
as trade between the United States and other countries
worldwide continues to expand, the question needs a uniform
answer.
The extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law to
conduct occurring abroad can raise sensitive international
political issues. Over 130 countries now have their own
competition laws, so one could argue that relief should be sought
under those laws. 3 While most are similar to U.S. antitrust law,
∗ Of Counsel, Ober|Kaler, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law,
Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012) (prohibiting agreements unreasonably
restraining competition, monopolization, attempted monopolization, and
conspiracies to monopolize affecting commerce among the states or with foreign
nations).
2. Id. § 6a.
3. Claire L. Leonard, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of the “Direct
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however, the competition policies of countries differ, as do the
details of their laws, their interpretation, the aggressiveness of
enforcement, and remedies. Nevertheless, care is warranted
when the United States attempts to apply its competition rules to
foreign parties or conduct occurring in foreign countries. On the
other hand, the United States would seem to have a legitimate
interest in protecting its consumers and markets from
anticompetitive effects resulting domestically, regardless of
where they originated or by whom they were implemented.
Ms. Leonard’s Note admirably outlines the history and case
development regarding the application of the Sherman Act to
violations that occur in foreign lands but affect U.S. commerce. 4
As she explains, barely some nineteen years after passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890, the Supreme Court, in America Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. (Alcoa), 5 held that application of U.S.
antitrust law to violations occurring elsewhere depended on the
locus of the unlawful conduct—if overseas, U.S. antitrust laws
were inapplicable, regardless of the effect on commerce or
competition in the United States. 6 That conclusion was effectively
overruled in 1945, when the Second Circuit (the Supreme Court
lacking a quorum), in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7
held that regardless of where the unlawful conduct occurred, the
Sherman Act applied if the challenged actions “[1] were intended
to affect imports and [2] did affect them.” 8 The court emphasized
that for the Sherman Act to apply, the parties and conduct had to
satisfy both the intent and effects elements. 9 As to the latter, it
Effect” Requirement Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016).
4. See id. at Part II (outlining the history of U.S. antitrust law’s
extraterritorial reach).
5. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
6. See id. at 355–56 (explaining that “the general and almost universal
rule is the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done”).
7. 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
8. Id. at 444; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
796 (1993) (citing Alcoa for the proposition that “the Sherman Act applies to
foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States”).
9. The Second Circuit noted, for example, that many restraints on
competition in foreign countries would have repercussions in the United States
without the perpetrators intending that they do so, but that “Congress certainly

THE MEANING OF DIRECT EFFECT

543

noted that it “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish
all who its courts can reach, for conduct which has no
consequences within the United States,” but that “it is settled
law . . . that any state may impose liabilities even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”10
The Alcoa formulation for extraterritorial application was
helpful as a general matter, focusing the analysis on effects on
domestic commerce and competition, but it left many specific
questions unanswered. How substantial must the effect be? How
direct? Is the intent element meant to require merely that an
effect in the United States be foreseeable or must there be a more
specific intent? Must the effect in the United States be what gives
rise to the plaintiff’s claim? These and other issues led to
significant confusion in the lower courts about precisely what the
test was. 11 Although most applied the general intent and
domestic-effect requirements of Alcoa, their interpretations
sometimes added different glosses and thus no totally uniform
standard emerged. 12
As a result, Congress sought to “clarify, perhaps to limit, but
not to expand . . . the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign
commerce” 13 and establish a uniform test by amending the
Sherman Act through passage of the FTAIA in 1982. 14 But if
Congress’s intent was to “clarify” this question, few would opine
that it succeeded. Far from a model of concise statutory drafting,
did not intend the [Sherman] Act to cover them,” and it “assume[d] that the Act
does not cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports
unless [their] performance is shown actually to have had some effect upon
them.” Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443; see also Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 797 n.24
(explaining that “the general understanding [is] that the Sherman Act covers
foreign conduct producing a substantial intended effect in the United States”).
10. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
11. Leonard, supra note 3, at 498–99.
12. Differences in the standards are described in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1177–89 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
13. F. Hoffman–LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
14. Note that the FTAIA applies only to claims under the Sherman Act, not
to claims under the Clayton, Robinson-Patman, or Federal Trade Commission
Acts.
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FTAIA provides, for purposes here, that the Sherman Act does
not apply to foreign commerce—period—unless (1) the commerce
is import commerce, or (2)(a) the unlawful foreign conduct has a
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” 15 on
non-import domestic commerce, and (b) the domestic “effect gives
rise to” 16 the plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim.
The FTAIA leaves unanswered many questions. Why should
import commerce be subject to the Sherman Act, regardless of
whether its domestic effect meets the FTAIA requirements? The
Alcoa standard raises other questions. What role, if any, does
comity with foreign countries, which FTAIA does not mention,
play in the analysis? 17 Under what circumstances does the
domestic effect of the violation give rise to the claim? And what
standards apply in determining whether the effect on domestic
commerce from the conduct is “direct,” “substantial,” and
“reasonably foreseeable”?
Ms. Leonard’s Note takes on one part of the last question—
how “direct” the relationship between the unlawful conduct and
its domestic effect must be for the conduct to fall within the
Sherman Act. In particular, her Note considers whether the
domestic effect must follow as an immediate consequence of the
defendant’s conduct, or, resulting in broader coverage, whether
there need only be a reasonably proximate causal connection
between the foreign conduct and its domestic effect. To some
15. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2012).
16. Id. § 6a(2).
17. International comity, an important consideration in setting limits on
the extraterritorial scope of U.S. laws, basically means “getting along” with
foreign jurisdictions by respecting the policies, laws, and decisions of foreign
countries in U.S. laws and courts. Leonard, supra note 3, at 503–04, 531–32.
The Supreme Court, in F. Hoffman–LaRoche v. Empagran S.A., recognized this,
explaining that it realized that application of American antitrust laws could
“interfere with a foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its own
commercial affairs.” F. Hoffman–LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 165. But trumping that,
the Court explained that American courts have long held that “application of
our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable,
and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as
they . . . redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct
has caused.” Id. Or as the Seventh Circuit en banc has noted, “Foreigners who
want to earn money from the sale of goods or services in American markets
should expect to have to comply with U.S. law.” Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium,
Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2012).
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extent, this question strikes me as one of how many angels can
dance on the head of a pin, and we might wonder how much
practical effect the difference will have in future decisions. But as
countries in the global economy become more economically
integrated, foreign transactions increase, and the Antitrust
Division prosecutions of global cartels affecting U.S. commerce
increase, a consistent, universally applied standard would seem
warranted. The Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue, and
the question needs an answer.
The disagreement stems primarily from conflicting decisions
of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. As Ms. Leonard’s Note
explains, in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 18 which one
judge described as “a case of first impression,” 19 a majority of the
panel, relying primarily on the definition of direct in a Supreme
Court decision 20 involving a different statute, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), held that for the effect on
domestic commerce to be direct under the FTAIA, it must “follow
as an immediate consequence of the defendant’s” unlawful
conduct. 21 Some eight years later, the Seventh Circuit, in MinnChem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 22 explicitly rejected that meaning of
the word and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, holding instead that
the effect is direct for purposes of the FTAIA if there was ‘“a
reasonably proximate causal nexus’” between the unlawful
conduct and its domestic effect. 23
Which standard is more appropriate? Ms. Leonard opts for
the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard and explains
her reasoning. I am not sure. Indeed, based on the analyses of the
two courts, I question whether there is a “right” answer with

18. 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
19. Id. at 683 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
20. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
21. LSL, 379 F.3d at 680.
22. 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
23. Id. at 857 (quoting Maken Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the
Sherman Act: Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to
Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 415, 430 (2005)). The
Minn-Chem court pointed out that this is the standard applied by the Antitrust
Division. See id. at 856–57 (“The other school of thought has been articulated by
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division . . . .”).
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underlying significant support. But forced to make a choice, I
would agree with Ms. Leonard’s conclusion.
Neither decision offers strongly convincing rationales for its
conclusion. The antitrust context in which the issue arose in LSL
was somewhat strange to begin with. The case was a civil
enforcement action by the Antitrust Division challenging a
horizontal market-allocation agreement between an American
firm, LSL, and an Israeli firm, Hazera, regarding particular
tomato seeds they were to develop together or on their own and
then market. 24 They agreed that LSL would have the exclusive
right to market the seeds in North America and thus that Hazera
would not compete there—a horizontal market-allocation
agreement. 25 As it turned out, LSL developed such a seed, but
Hazera did not, 26 and thus, the agreement had no effect on
competition between them or on U.S. commerce. Only if and when
Hazera did develop a seed would the market-allocation
agreement certainly restrain competition and have an effect on
domestic commerce. 27 The Ninth Circuit held that because
Hazera had no seed and whether it would ever develop one of its
own was “speculative at best,” the agreement had no direct effect
on domestic commerce, suggesting that a plaintiff subjected to
foreign conduct violating the antitrust laws but falling within
FAITA could never challenge it before actual harm resulted. And
interestingly, under this analysis, it would have done the
Antitrust Division no good had the court chosen the “reasonably
proximate causal nexus” standard rather than the “immediate
consequence” standard because there was no domestic effect at
all. 28 Given its view, one wonders why the majority even went to
24. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir.
2004) (summarizing the relationship between the parties and the basis for LSL’s
claim).
25. Id.
26. See id. (“To date, Hazera has not developed a long shelf-life tomato
seed.”).
27. See id. at 675 (explaining the “Restrictive Clause” of the LSL-Hazera
agreement addendum and its ban on selling long shelf-life tomato seeds in
North America).
28. In determining whether an agreement affects interstate commerce for
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court examines the harm that would
result if the conspiracy were successful rather than whether the conspiracy had
any actual effect. See Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330–32 (1991)
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the trouble of defining direct. Perhaps the court should have done
what others had—dodge the issue. 29
That aside, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in settling on the
“immediate consequence” standard does not seem strong. The
court appeared to view the issue as whether, in passing the
FTAIA, Congress intended merely to codify the common law
intent and effect requirements of Alcoa and its progeny or
whether it intended to establish a new standard. 30 As Ms.
Leonard’s Note explains, common law on the issue would favor
the “reasonably proximate causal nexus” meaning of direct over
requiring that the domestic effect be the “immediate
consequence” of the conduct.
In holding that an effect is direct only if it follows as an
immediate consequence of the defendant’s conduct, the Court
appeared to rely primarily on two factors. First, it consulted a
dictionary and found that one definition of direct is “‘proceeding
from one point to another in time or space without deviation or
interruption.’” 31 The problem is that this is only one of several
dictionary definitions of the word; others suggest that the
consequence need not be immediate. 32 For example, the
dissenting judge pointed out that the very same dictionary from
(determining that, as in all cases involving § 1 of the Sherman Act in which the
per se rule applies, it is the agreement itself that is unlawful). The federal
antitrust enforcement agencies would apply the same principle in foreign
commerce situations. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.121 Illustrative
Example B (1995) (noting that circumstances triggering the application of the
FTAIA requires agencies to “focus on the potential harm that would ensue if the
conspiracy were successful, not on whether the actual conduct in furtherance of
the conspiracy had in fact the prohibited effect upon interstate or foreign
commerce”).
29. See LSL, 379 F.3d at 684 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“Although other
appellate courts have dodged the critical issue . . . , this panel has decided to
face the dragon in his teeth and stop tap dancing around the meaning of the
word direct” (quotation omitted)).
30. See id. at 678 (“[M]any courts have debated whether the FTAIA
established a new jurisdictional standard or merely codified the standard
applied in Alcoa and its progeny.”).
31. Id. at 680 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
640 (1982)).
32. See id. at 692 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (noting that the same dictionary
source utilized by the majority “contains seven main meanings in the adjective
form, encompassing 31 more specific subsidiary meanings”).
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which the majority drew its definition also defined direct as “‘a
close especially logical, causal, or consequential relationship.’” 33
Thus, the majority’s choosing one dictionary meaning over
others seems very weak support for its conclusion. 34
Second, the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 35 where the question
was the meaning of direct as used in an entirely different
statute, the FSIA. 36 That statute provides, in part, that
sovereign immunity from U.S. law does not apply to foreign
states where their conduct causes a direct effect in the United
States. 37 But reliance on the meaning of direct in the FSIA
seems questionable. All else equal, the circumstances under
which a foreign government should be liable under U.S. law
should be narrower than those under which private parties are.
In sum, the majority opinion does not seem well-reasoned or
supported.
In the Seventh Circuit’s Minn-Chem decision, the
plaintiffs, U.S. purchasers of potash from foreign producers,
alleged that several foreign and U.S. producers had agreed on
prices to charge in foreign countries and then used those as
benchmarks for prices to charge in the United States. 38 After
first holding that the FTAIA’s substantiality and foreseeability
requirements were clearly met, 39 the court focused on the
33. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640
(1981)).
34. See id. (“It would be arbitrary simply to pick one definition and declare
it the ‘plain meaning’ in the abstract.”).
35. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
36. See id. at 618 (holding that Argentina’s bond payment rescheduling had
a direct effect in the United States, where Argentina was to perform its ultimate
contractual obligations, even though the bond holders were foreign
corporations).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012) (codifying general exceptions to the
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state).
38. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2012)
(noting that “by 2008 potash prices had increased at least 600%” and that the
“plaintiffs assert that this increase cannot be explained by a significant uptick
in demand, changes in the cost of production, or other changes in input costs”).
39. See id. at 856 (determining that “the potash cartel described in the
Complaint is one for which the requirements of substantiality and foreseeability
are easily met” and that foreseeability is also straightforward because the
international cartel controlled 71% of the world’s supply of a homogeneous
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meaning of direct. 40 It rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on
the Supreme Court’s definition of the term as used in the FSIA. 41
Noting that the FSIA includes no requirements of substantiality
and foreseeability while the FTAIA does, it explained that the
three requirements as used in the FTAIA should not be
considered as separate, independent requirements. 42 But because
“Congress put them there, . . . it signaled that the word ‘direct’
used along with [substantiality and foreseeability] must be
interpreted as part of an integrated phrase” because
“[s]uperimposing the idea of ‘immediate consequence’ on top of
the full phrase [including substantiality and foreseeability]
results in a stricter test than the complete text of the statute can
bear.” 43 Direct imports might meet this “immediate consequence”
requirement, but they were already explicitly excluded from
coverage under the FTAIA.
Second, the court explained that the direct-effect
requirement merely reflected the classic concern that the effect
not be too remote from its cause. 44 Then, without much further
explanation, the court concluded that the “reasonably proximate
causal nexus” meaning of direct was more consistent with the
language of the statute. 45
Neither LSL nor Minn-Chem seems to present convincing
rationales for their results. But two factors lead me to agree with
Ms. Leonard’s conclusion that the more encompassing
“reasonably proximate causal nexus” meaning is the better choice
than the more exclusionary “immediate consequence” meaning.
commodity).
40. See id. (“The question that has caused more discussion among various
courts and commentators is what it takes to show ‘direct’ effects.”).
41. See id. at 857 (finding that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly assumed that
the FSIA and the FTAIA use the word direct in the same manner).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id. (explaining that the practical effect of direct-effect requirement
excludes from the Sherman Act “foreign activities that are too remote from the
ultimate effects on U.S. domestic or import commerce”).
45. Id. More recently, the Second Circuit also rejected the “immediate
consequence” meaning of direct for the same reasons as the Seventh Circuit in
Minn-Chem. See Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 398
(2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting the interpretation of “direct . . . effect” advanced by the
Ninth Circuit).
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First, if Congress had intended to adopt the “immediate
consequence” meaning of direct, then it likely would not have
included the foreseeability requirement because the two concepts
are not separable; they must be read together because the
concept of remoteness is part of both. Foreseeability, to me,
connotes that an effect may not be the immediate consequence of
the action but that the conduct and effect are sufficiently direct,
or not so remote, that the defendants should have foreseen the
effects that resulted. To me, that the effect must be foreseeable
rules out the Ninth Circuit’s definition of direct as covering only
an immediate consequence because foreseeability encompasses
effects that are not immediate in the way the Ninth Circuit used
that term.
The second reason I agree with Ms. Leonard’s conclusion is
the similarity between this issue and that of when a plaintiff is a
proper party to recover for an antitrust violation—when a
plaintiff has so-called “antitrust standing.” 46 Just as Congress did
not intend the FTAIA to permit suits for all foreign restraints on
competition affecting domestic commerce however remote, 47 it did
not intend to permit every person injured by an antitrust
violation, no matter how tangentially, to recover damages. 48
There must be limiting factors in both situations; in fact, the
purpose of both the antitrust standing requirements and the
FTAIA is to limit—in the former case, the plaintiffs who may
46. To recover damages for an antitrust violation, plaintiff must show that
it has “antitrust standing” (specifically, that it is a proper party to bring the
case). See generally Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539–46 (1983) (discussing the factors
courts examine and balance when determining whether a plaintiff has antitrust
standing). The antitrust standing requirement significantly limits the universe
of parties injured by the violation who may recover damages. See, e.g., Del.
Valley Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1119–20 (9th
Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted provisions
of antitrust statutes affording remedies, in this case § 4 of the Clayton Act,
“thereby constraining the class of parties that have statutory standing to
recover damages through antitrust suits”).
47. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 854 (7th Cir. 2012)
(determining that Congress’s construction of the FTAIA indicates that they did
not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to “every arrangement that literally can
be said to involve trade or commerce with foreign nations”).
48. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972)
(“Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for
all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.”).
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recover damages and in the latter case, in essence, who can
recover for a violation in a foreign country. 49
The Supreme Court provided the appropriate factors to
examine for determining antitrust standing in Associated General
Contractors of California v. California State Council of
Carpenters (AGC). 50 Some of those factors and the direct and
foreseeability requirements of the FTAIA are quite similar. The
Court explained preliminarily that the common law provided
limits on recovery in tort and contract cases by examining factors
such as “foreseeability and proximate cause, [and] directness of
injury,” 51 and that although it did not debate these limitations
when enacting Section 4(a) of the Clayton Act, 52 the statute
authorizing recovery of damages in antitrust cases, it must have
assumed that antitrust plaintiffs “would be subject to constraints
comparable to well-accepted common law rules applied in
comparable litigation.” 53 It would seem that Congress, aware of
the common law on the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act flowing from Alcoa and its progeny, would have had
those principles in mind when enacting FTAIA. The “reasonably
proximate causal nexus” meaning of direct embodies those
principles to a much greater extent than the Ninth Circuit’s
“immediate consequence” meaning. The Ninth Circuit suggested
that Congress, in passing FTAIA, did not merely codify the
common law but rather established a new “immediate
consequence” standard. 54 There is no reason to believe that,
49. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) (explaining that “Congress did not intend
the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might be
traced to an antitrust violation”); see also supra notes 13–16 and accompanying
text (describing Congress’s intent in passing the FTAIA).
50. See 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (determining that a labor union did not have
standing to bring a lawsuit alleging that an association of employers conspired
with third parties and members of the association to refuse to engage in
collective bargaining).
51. Id. at 532.
52. The statute, read literally, would permit “any person” injured by an
antitrust violation to recover damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (emphasis
added).
53. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533.
54. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir.
2004) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“The flash point of controversy, however, is
whether the word ‘direct’ in the FTAIA is a new dimension added to traditional
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however, particularly because the stated purpose of the statute
was to “clarify” existing law, 55 not replace it.
In AGC, the Court explained that a plaintiff’s antitrust
standing should depend on its “harm, the alleged wrongdoing by
the defendants, and the relationship between them,” 56 just as the
applicability of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct should depend
on the relationship between the violation and its relationship to
domestic commerce. The Court then cited six factors that courts
should examine in determining whether a plaintiff is an
appropriate party to recover damages and thus to have antitrust
standing. 57 At least three seem directly relevant to the question
of whether the Sherman Act should apply to unlawful conduct
undertaken in foreign countries that affects U.S. commerce. 58
Each is more commensurate with the “reasonably proximate
causal nexus” meaning of direct than with the “immediate
consequence” meaning.
The first is the degree of causal connection between the
violation and the plaintiff’s injury—seemingly, whether the
violation is the proximate cause because the Court had previously
indicated that common law principles, including proximate cause
of the injury, provide guidance. 59 The second factor is whether the
defendants intended to cause the plaintiff’s harm. 60 This seems
antitrust law that involves trade or commerce with foreign nations, as the
majority concludes . . . .”).
55. See F. Hoffman–LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169–70
(2004) (noting that the language and history of the FTAIA suggest that
Congress designed the act to clarify (or perhaps to limit), but not to expand in
any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce).
56. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983) (noting that the question of whether the
union may recover for the injury it allegedly suffered cannot be answered simply
by reference to the broad language of § 4 of the Clayton Act).
57. See id. at 537–45 (listing factors relevant to whether a plaintiff is a
person injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
antitrust laws, and therefore entitled to treble damages).
58. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (analyzing each of the
three factors which seem directly relevant to the Sherman Act’s international
reach).
59. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 532–33, 537 (explaining
that the common law required plaintiffs to prove, with certainty, both the
existence of damages and the causal connection between the wrong and the
injury).
60. Id.
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akin to a foreseeability requirement. Intent and foreseeability are
not synonymous but are closely related. Where a defendant
intends to injure a plaintiff that injury is certainly foreseeable.
The Minn-Chem court noted that an injury is foreseeable when
the “effects . . . are a rationally expected outcome of the
conduct.” 61 If they are a rationally expected outcome, they would
seem to be intended. If the effect on domestic commerce must be
immediate for the Sherman Act to apply, one has to wonder why
Congress included the foreseeability requirement, which connotes
a less direct relationship between the conduct and its effect.
The third factor is “the directness or indirectness of the
asserted injury” or the “chain of causation between the
[plaintiff’s] injury and the alleged restraints . . . .” 62 Here, the
Court appeared to be using the term direct to connote
“remoteness” between the plaintiff and the alleged violation. In
AGC, the plaintiffs’ injury was too remote for antitrust standing
because others were more directly injured by the violation and
thus would be more appropriate plaintiffs; the plaintiffs were
“more remote part[ies]” than others. 63
AGC was decided after passage of the FTAIA, so one cannot
argue that Congress simply drew the direct and foreseeable
factors incorporated in the FTAIA from that decision. But these
are common law concepts with which the FTAIA drafters were
likely familiar and that seem to have application to both the
question of when a plaintiff should have antitrust standing and
the appropriateness of applying the Sherman Act to foreign
conduct affecting domestic commerce. And they are familiar
principles with which courts have substantial experience in
applying.
The issue Ms. Leonard discusses is a narrow and relatively
esoteric one about which little has been written. Decisions are
61. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing whether the potash cartel described in the Complaint meets the
requirements of “substantiality” and “foreseeability” under the FTAIA).
62. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540 (1983).
63. See id. at 540–42 (determining that the injuries alleged by the Union
were the indirect result of whatever harm may have been suffered by “certain”
construction contractors and subcontractors); id. at 542 n.25 (appearing to tie
directness of the injury and remoteness).
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few and the rationales in those that do exist appear relatively
weak. Thus, Ms. Leonard’s Note is a welcome addition in
answering and explaining what should be, but is not, a simple
question—the meaning of a seemingly simple word. Particularly
given the scant authorities and guidance, Ms. Leonard’s Note
handles the analysis well, and she reaches the right conclusion.

